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INTRODUCTION
America's struggle with residential segregation is nothing new. Over the past
forty years, courts and legislatures have tried to dismantle this country's history of
racial segregation and promote diversity. As housing policies shifted away from
building governmentally owned and operated "hard" public housing units, housing
choice voucher ("HCV") programs increased.' These HCV programs, formerly
known as Section 8 vouchers, provide low-income families the means to rent
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I would like
to thank Professor Susan Williams for helping me develop this Note, Professor Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer for his helpful suggestions, and Professors James Rosenbaum and Leonard
Rubinowitz for stimulating my interest in the Gautreaux litigation and public housing
generally. Finally, I would like to thank my family and Matt for their support.
1. These housing voucher programs are governed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f, 1437z-5
(2000).
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apartments in the private market.2 Many qualifying families are given a monthly
assistance payment for the amount that their rent exceeds 30% of their family's
monthly adjusted income. 3 Nearly every new federal dollar designated for low-
income housing since the mid-1980s has gone to support these HCV programs.4
The vouchers are funded through grants from the U.S. Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development to be administered by a local public housing authority. 5 These
federal funds may be used by the recipient anywhere in the United States.
6
Currently, nearly 1.7 million households nationwide receive a housing voucher.7
Supporters of HCVs believe that "voucher and certificate programs work better and
are less expensive than public housing and other forms of project-based
assistance."
8
The success of HCVs depends on the ability of the programs to reduce
concentrations of poverty and increase the recipients' housing choices.9 As "hard"
public housing units-that is, units owned and operated by the government-are
phased out and demolished across the country, the number of former public
housing residents receiving HCVs increases. Vouchers were chosen as the
prevailing housing program because of their purported ability to disperse public
housing residents throughout a metropolitan area and reduce overall racial
segregation across cities. However, there are growing concerns that vouchers
2. Id. § 1437f(f)(7). The funding given to each family is based on a payment standard
which may "not exceed 110 percent of the fair market rental ... for the same size of
dwelling unit in the same market area and shall not be less than 90 percent of that fair market
rental." Id. § 1437f(o)(1)(B).
3. Id. § 1437f(o)(2)(A). The monthly assistance payment for each family is "the amount
by which the rent ... exceeds the greatest of the following... : (i) 30 percent of the monthly
adjusted income of the family[;] (ii) 10 percent of the monthly income of the family[;]" or
(iii) the amount designated in welfare assistance payments to meet the family's housing
costs. Id. When a family initially begins receiving assistance, the family may not be required
to pay more than 40% of its monthly adjusted income for rent. § 1437f(o)(3). See generally
MARY K. CUNNINGHAM & SUSAN J. POPKIN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, CHAC MOBILITY
COUNSELING ASSESSMENT: FINAL REPORT 1 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.urban.orglUploadedPDF/410588_CHACReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2004)
(assessing the effectiveness of Chicago's voucher program by following voucher holders for
twelve months).
4. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing
Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 289 (2002).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(1)(A).
6. Lynn E. Cunningham, Managing Assets/Managing Families: Reconceptualizing
Affordable Housing Solutions for Extended Families, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY.
DEv. L. 390, 393 (2002).
7. CUNNINGHAM & POPIUN, supra note 3, at 1 (reporting HUD data from 2000).
8. JOHN C. WEICHER, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PRIVATIZING SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING 43 (1997). Cf. Sam Brownback, Resolving HUD's Existing Problems Should Take
Precedence Over Implementing New Policies, 16 ST. LOuIS U. PUB. L. REv. 235 (1997).
Senator Sam Brownback asserts that "[w]ith its origins in the Depression, project-based
public housing was developed both for its direct job-creating potential and to meet the
housing needs of the eligible poor. It is this dual purpose that explains why project-based
assistance, on average, costs up to twice as much as vouchers for each family assisted." Id. at
241 (footnote omitted).
9. See generally LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE
CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 27 (2000).
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cannot meet these goals. Former public housing residents appear to be clustering in
poor communities near their original public housing unit.'t
This Note argues that current HCV programs are inadequate to meet their
original goals of dispersing public housing residents throughout a metropolitan area
and reducing overall racial segregation in the city. In the 1960s, courts across the
nation found acts of local, state, and federal governments racially discriminatory
and illegal under Title VI. These holdings led to often-criticized court-ordered
remedies. While the vast majority of these remedies are no longer being
implemented, they should not be forgotten. The implementation and outcomes of
court-ordered remedies provide an opportunity to better understand the social
problems associated with race in this country. This Note addresses the remedies
that resulted from the Gautreaux litigation in Chicago. The lessons learned from
this litigation should help to shape housing policy in the future. Specifically, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") should require local
housing agencies administering a HCV program to show program recipients
available rental properties in middle- and upper-class neighborhoods. In order for
units in such areas to be a real option for the recipient, programs and policies must
remove the many barriers that poor households face when they seek to relocate to a
wealthier neighborhood. Not only are increased counseling and support services
necessary to remove structural and financial barriers, but programs are also needed
to shift individual preferences. Racial and economic integration cannot be
successful so long as individuals refuse to live next door to people who are racially
and socioeconomically different from themselves. To shift these preferences, the
government should institute mobility grants, and equity insurance programs, as
well as increase investigation and prosecution of those who commit hate crimes.
This Note uses Chicago as a case study. Chicago is similar to many cities: it
has a history of residential segregation and a shortage of low-income housing.
Chicago's history also illustrates the government's general shift in policy goals
away from racial integration toward improving economic integration. I argue that
poor minority families, particularly past public housing residents, face unique
barriers that must be addressed, even under a housing program that focuses on
developing mixed-income communities. When implementing a HCV program that
targets past public housing residents, a "colorblind" approach is not enough. The
lessons of Chicago's Gautreaux litigation and its subsequent remedies illustrate the
necessity of supporting a metropolitan-wide mobility program.
Part One of this Note discusses the Gautreaux litigation." In these cases,
10. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., SECTION 8 MOBILITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD
HEALTH: EMERGING ISSUES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 2000, http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/sec8_mobility.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (citing PAUL FISCHER, A RACIAL
PERSPECTIVE ON SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE CHICAGO SUBURBS (2000)).
11. The district court in Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1981),
summarized the litigation's primary cases:
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F.Supp. 582
(N.D.11.1967) (tenants have the right to maintain an action alleging that
housing is being administered in a racially discriminatory manner);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F.Supp. 582
(N.D.nl. 1967) (evidence established that CHA intentionally chose sites
and adopted tenant assignment procedures for the purpose of
maintaining existing patterns of residential separation of the races);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F.Supp. 736
2004]
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plaintiffs attacked the Chicago Housing Authority's ("CHA") and HUD's history
of segregated housing practices, which led to two judicial remedies. First, the
courts compelled the CHA to develop "scattered-site" public housing units.
Second, a consent decree required HUD to fund a metropolitan-wide Section 8
voucher program. As a result of this mandate, HUD developed the Gautreaux
Assisted Housing Program ("GAHP"). While both remedies faced numerous
challenges, the GAHP was more successful. GAHP's success contributed to the
nation-wide policy shift from "hard" public housing units to voucher programs.
Understanding why GAHP was successful is important to avoid recreating isolated
and predominately poor minority communities.
Part Two provides explanations for why housing discrimination and
segregation persist. This Note focuses on the individual, community, and
programmatic barriers to desegregation and discusses how the accumulation of
rational individual preferences results in segregated communities. It discusses how
these barriers affect the implementation of scattered-site housing and HCV
programs, particularly how they limit the housing stock available to voucher
recipients and, thus, the recipients' options.
Part Three focuses on Chicago's current attempts to use HCV programs to
disperse low-income families throughout the city. The GAHP officially ended in
1998, when HUD satisfied its court-ordered obligation to provide desegregated
(N.D.Ill.1969) (supplemental judgment order ordering that no public
housing be developed in census tracts with more than 30% minority
population); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 436 F.2d 306
(7th Cir. 1970); cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922, 91 S.Ct. 1378, 28 L.Ed.2d
661 (1971) (no abuse of discretion, a year after original order entered, to
impose deadlines for submissions to plan commission and city council);
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971) (dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction of a request for injunction against HUD prohibiting it
from continuing to provide relief to CHA reversed); Gautreaux v.
Romney, 332 F.Supp. 366 (N.D.Ill.1971), rev'd 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.
1972) (insufficient nexus between CHA housing program and HUD's
Model Cities program to permit enjoining of Model Cities funds to
Chicago because of lack of compliance with 1969 judgment order);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F.Supp. 827
(N.D.IUl.1972), affd sub nom., Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144, 94 S.Ct. 895, 39
L.Ed.2d 98 (1974) (district court ordered CHA to by-pass Chicago City
Council approval for selection of sites for low rent housing); Gautreaux
v. Romney, 363 F.Supp. 690 (N.D.l11.1973), rev'd sub nom. Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974) (district
court has authority to order suburban or metropolitan area relief for
constitutional violations occurring within city limits); Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 384 F.Supp. 37 (N.D.Ill.1974), petition for
writ of mandamus denied sub nom., Chicago Housing Authority v.
Austin, 511 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1975) (district court has the authority to
refer the issue of intracity relief to a U.S. Magistrate to serve as a
Master); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 96 S.Ct. 1538, 47 L.Ed.2d
792 (1976) (district court has the authority to undertake remedial efforts
beyond the boundaries of the municipality in which the constitut:onal
violation occurred and may, in its discretion, order metropolitan relief).
Id. at 667 (original spacing maintained).
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housing opportunities to 7100 families. 12 Chicago's current HCV programs face
special challenges due to the demolition of thousands of CHA public housing units.
Apart from the loss of physical housing stock, an immediate need exists to relocate
thousands of former public housing tenants who have special needs. This Note
argues that vouchers can be an appropriate means of rectifying past discrimination,
but relying solely on the private rental market only perpetuates segregation.
Chicago's past experiments with scattered-site housing and the GAHP provide
guidance for overcoming barriers voucher holders face when integrating into
mostly white, middle-class communities. Clearly, the government cannot force
integration and diversity. Instead, housing policies and regulations must support
individual homeowners, landlords, and voucher recipients when making individual
choices that further integration. Housing policy must allow recipients a true choice
of housing locations and shift individual preferences toward diversity. This Note
argues that along with increased counseling and support services for voucher
recipients, the government should institute mobility grants and equity insurance
programs. Increased investigation and prosecution of those who commit hate
crimes is imperative. Experience has shown that metropolitan-wide mobility
programs are necessary to provide all people with the opportunity to live in an
economically viable community.
I. COURT-CREATED HOUSING POLICY: THE GAUTREAUX LITIGATION
Chicago has a long history of housing segregation. 13 Between 1955 and 1965,
the CHA built nearly 10,000 apartment units. 14 These apartments were
concentrated in mid-rise and high-rise buildings in a relatively small number of
housing developments.' 5 The developments were built along two corridors
beginning in Chicago's downtown and extending south and west.' 6 This created
residential clustering as "white residents moved from South and West Side
neighborhoods into outlying city and suburban areas, while nearly equivalent
numbers of African-American (and a smaller stream of Latino) residents located in
neighborhoods closer to the central city.,'
17
At nearly the same time, a significant portion of Chicago's industrial firms
relocated, downsized, or went out of business. The effects of "Chicago's
deindustrialization were especially pronounced in inner-city, largely minority
neighborhoods on the city's South and West Sides. Unemployment shot up and
other signs of neighborhood stress, such as declining school performance by young
people, rising crime rates, and residential abandonment" became commonplace.' 8
The selective out-migration of working and middle-class blacks concentrated
12. CUNNINGHAM & POPKIN, supra note 3, at 1-2.
13. For a detailed discussion of Chicago's history of segregated housing, see HARVEY
WARREN ZORBAUGH, THE GOLD COAST AND THE SLUM: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF
CHICAGO'S NEAR NORTH SIDE (Phoenix ed. 1976).
14. See Larry Bennett, Restructuring the Neighborhood: Public Housing
Redevelopment and Neighborhood Dynamics in Chicago, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 54, 55 (2000) (examining four cases of public housing redevelopment
in Chicago).
15.Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 55-56.
18. Id. at 56.
2004]
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poverty and other social problems in inner-city ghettos across the nation.19 As
social capital left the inner city, the remaining residents became isolated from
upwardly mobile role models, neighborhood institutions, and social networks that
provide access to mainstream vehicles of social control and resistance to social
problems such as crime, teenage pregnancy, and dropping out of high school.20
Aldermen on the Chicago City Council reacted to these demographic shifts by
instituting policies that further defined Chicago's developing patterns of housing
segregation. The aldermen feared that public housing was the first step to
neighborhood racial transition.2 1 These racial shifts threatened the aldermen by
undermining their traditional political networks and voting blocks. In 1955, the city
council made CHA site proposals subject to a local alderman veto. Between "the
mid-1950s until the mid-1960s, white aldermen routinely blocked the siting of
CHA projects within their wards"; black aldermen did not. 22
In 1966, nearly 43,000 black residents of and applicants for public housing
brought a class action suit against the CHA and HUD alleging that the agencies
discriminatorily built public housing in predominately black neighborhoods and
assigned tenants to housing projects based on their race.23 This began the
Gautreaux litigation.
A. The Chicago Housing Authority Remedy
In the 1967 case, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority ("Gautreaux /'), 24
the federal district court denied the CHA's motion to dismiss and stated that the
plaintiffs "[had] the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have sites selected
for public housing projects without regard to the racial composition of either the
surrounding neighborhood or of the projects themselves." 25 In 1969, the federal
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the
CHA violated the Civil Rights Act of 186626 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by building public housing and discriminatorily assigning
19. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987)
(discussing the social plight of and public policy approaches toward the ghetto underclass).
20. Bennett, supra note 14, at 60. While William J. Wilson's theory is controversial, the
Seventh Circuit appears to agree with this "cycle of poverty" analysis. See infra text
accompanying notes 71-80.
21. Bennett, supra note 14, at 56.
22. Id. Indeed,
CHA admitted that it had followed a policy of informally clearing
proposed family public housing sites with the alderman in whose ward
the proposed site was located and of eliminating each site opposed by
the alderman. This procedure had resulted in the rejection of 99 % of
the units proposed for sites in white areas which had been initially
selected as suitable for public housing by CHA.
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 287 n.4 (1976) (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
296 F. Supp. 907, 910, 912-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969)).
23. See RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 9, at 1; Schuck, supra note 4, at 319-
20.
24. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
25. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2000).
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tenants to the developments based on their race.27 The court based its ruling on
uncontested evidence which showed that the public housing system was racially
segregated. Specifically, the court noted that four projects with an overwhelmingly
white resident population were located in white neighborhoods, while the rest of
the family units (over 99%) were located in black neighborhoods and housed nearly
all black tenants (99%).28
To remedy these violations, the district court ordered the development of
"scattered-site housing. '29 While dicta in the court's 1967 opinion denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss appears to support color-blind procedures,3 the
court's 1969 remedy is race-based in that it sought to substantially increase the
number of public housing units in areas where the majority of the residents were
white. 31 To this end, the court ordered the CHA to build or buy 700 family units in
low-rise buildings in predominantly .white areas of Chicago.32 The court also
enjoined the CHA from building public housing in non-white areas without
simultaneous construction of at least 75% (later just 50% 33) of all new family
public housing units in predominately white areas inside Chicago or Cook
County.34 A non-white area was understood to have an African-American
population of at least 30% and was called a "Limited Public Housing Area."35 The
remainder of Cook County was included in the "General Public Housing Area."36
The court also ordered the CHA to change its tenant-assignment procedures.
27. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913-14 (N.D. 111. 1969).
28. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 288 (1976). "[T]he public housing system
operated by the CHA was racially segregated, with four overwhelmingly white projects
located in white neighborhoods and with 99V2% of the remaining family units located in
Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units occupied by Negro tenants." Id.
29. Id. at 289-91.
30. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The
court stated that the plaintiffs have the "right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have sites
selected for public housing projects without regard to the racial composition of either the
surrounding neighborhood or of the projects themselves." Id. (emphasis added).
31. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 740 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
32. Id. at 738.
33. Joseph Seliga, Comment, Gautreaux a Generation Later: Remedying the Second
Ghetto or Creating the Third?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1049, 1060 (2000). 'This ratio was later
reduced to one unit in the General Area for every one unit in the Limited Area as a result of
difficulties in constructing scattered-site units." Id. at 1057; see also Gautreaux v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. at 739.
34. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 666 (N.D. ll. 1981).
35. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. at 737. There was a significant
increase in the number of Latinos in Chicago between 1969 and the present. By the 1990
Census, Latinos composed nearly 20% of Chicago's total population. Seliga, supra note 33,
at 1061. While the Gautreaux judgment "order considers the Limited Housing Area to be
those areas having greater than thirty percent non-white population," the district court in
Gautreaux v. Pierce, 548 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (N.D. Ill. 1982), interpreted "non-white" or
"minority" to stand exclusively for African-Americans. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1061. The
court reasoned that "the exclusion of African-Americans from housing opportunities in
predominately white areas ... was the impetus for the Gautreaux litigation." Id. Thus, low-
income Latino neighborhoods were considered part of the General Area. Id. at 1061-62.
Since 1987, "over fifty percent of the 1822 scattered-site units built or purchased by the
receiver have been located in census tracts in which the population is at least sixty percent
Latino." Id. at 1062.
36. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. at 737.
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Half of the new units could be reserved for low-income families who already lived
in the new development's neighborhood. The other available units were assigned
on a on a first-come, first-served basis.37 Race was not considered. Finally, the
court prohibited the housing authority from building "large numbers of dwelling
units in or near a single location; and ... dwelling units . . . of more than 240
persons."
38
The court hoped that the scattered-site developments would "foster peaceful,
stable integration, minimize white 'fight and flight,' reduce public housing's
stigma, and reassure the community about the neighborhoods' futures." 39 These
hopes were squelched when political resistance from white, black, and Latino
neighborhoods impeded the program's implementation. In 1972, a frustrated
district court ordered the CHA to by-pass the City Council's approval of sites
selected for low-rent housing.40 For nearly twenty years, the CHA halted almost all
construction. During this time, the CHA waiting list grew to more than 40,000
people.4'
Finally, the court appointed a receiver to administer the CHA in 1987.42 The
court appointed the Habitat Company, a private developer, to manage the
construction of all new CHA housing. Between 1969 and 1997, less than 300
scattered-site housing units were constructed 43 in more than fifty-seven Chicago
communities." However, the new units were not built in the predominately white
communities the plaintiffs envisioned.45
Since 1987, "over fifty percent of the 1822 scattered-site units built or
purchased by the receiver have been located in census tracts in which the
population is at least sixty percent Latino" and only 7.2% of the public housing
units have been built in areas with a population more than 70% white.46 Political
opposition, high land prices, and a lack of vacant land and federal funds were
blamed for making "development of scattered-site units in majority white areas
prohibitively expensive. ' 47 The scattered-site housing plan was also constrained by
the Supreme Court. Originally, the judgment order considered that "one-third of
[the] scattered-site housing could be built in the suburbs of Cook County,
37. Each applicant was placed on a waiting list based on when his or her application
was received. Id. at 739-40, 742 (citing Pls.' Ex. B). The applicant at the top of the list was
offered at least two, but up to three, available apartments starting with the location with the
highest vacancy rate. If the applicant rejected the available units, he or she was placed at the
end of the list. Id. at 742-43 (citing Pls.' Ex. B).
38. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 666.
39. Schuck, supra note 4, at 320; see also RUBINowrrz & ROSENBAUM, supra note 9, at
1-2; Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. at 736 (enforcing Gautreaux v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969)).
40. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. 111. 1972), affd sub
nom., Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973).
41. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC HOUSING
TRANSFORMATION: GAUTREAUX, at www.bpichicago.org/pht/gautreaux.html (last visited
Jan. 13, 2004) [hereinafter BPI].
42. RUBINOwrrz & ROSENBAUM, supra note 9, at 27.
43. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1060.
44. BPI, supra note 41.
45. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1974).
46. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1062; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1062.
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surrounding Chicago, through the cooperation of local governments. 48 However,
the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley, prevented inter-district
remedies for racial segregation when the remedy would impermissibly interfere
with local governments. 49 Requiring the CHA to construct scattered-site housing in
the Chicago suburbs would impermissibly interfere with local government
operations.90
Forty thousand families are included in the Gautreaux I judgment order, but
only 6% of these public housing residents live in scattered-site housing created
under Gautreaux I. This is a far cry from the results the Gautreaux I court hoped
for when ordering a remedy for the CHA's constitutional violation.
B. The Department of Housing and Urban Development Remedy
In a companion suit, Gautreaux v. Landrieu ("Gautreaux I1") the same
plaintiffs alleged HUD "sanctioned and assisted CHA's racially discriminatory
public housing." 52 Plaintiffs sought to prevent HUD from providing further
assistance to the CHA until these practices were eliminated. The district court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in 1971, but the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed after determining that HUD could be held liable along with the
CHA for the local housing authority's discriminatory policies because HUD knew
of and did not stop these unconstitutional practices.5 3
1. Metropolitan-Wide Remedy: Including the Suburbs
The Seventh Circuit held that HUD violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment 54 and the Civil Rights Act of 196455 for funding a racially
discriminatory public housing system in Chicago.56 In Gautreaux II, the court of
appeals held that a metropolitan-wide plan was "necessary and equitable" to
remedy HUD's past discrimination.5 7 In this case, the Seventh Circuit was forced to
distinguish Milliken v. Bradley.58 In Milliken, the Supreme Court reversed a
judgment of the Sixth Circuit, which approved metropolitan-wide relief in the
school desegregation context. 59 The Milliken plan would have required the fifty-
four school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area to consolidate in an effort to
remedy racial discrimination in the operation of the Detroit public schools.
48. Id. at 1061 n.65 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 739
(N.D. Ill. 1969)).
49. 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
50. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1065 n.65.
51. Id. at 1049-50.
52. 523 F. Supp. 665, 667 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
53. Id. at 667 ("Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that HUD was liable along with CHA
for Chicago's discriminatory housing patterns because HUD knowingly acquiesced to
CHA's unconstitutional procedures." (citing Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.
1971))); see also Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55.42 U.S.C. § 2000.
56. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 289 (citing Romney, 448 F.2d at 739-40).
57. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d at 936.
58. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
59. Id.
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The court of appeals found metropolitan-wide relief was appropriate in
Gautreaux 11 because, unlike local schools, there was not a "deeply rooted tradition
of local control of public housing; rather, public housing is a federally supervised
program with early roots in federal statutes." 6 Housing discrimination had been
prohibited by federal law for more than a century.
61
Second, the court found that the problems inherent in building public housing
outside of Chicago's city limits did not pose the same administrative burdens posed
by bussing thousands of school children to schools under the control of other local
governments. 62 The court equated both the CHA and HUD to any other landowner
and saw any problems arising from housing construction as insignificant when
compared to restructuring an entire school system.
63
The court differentiated Milliken in a third way. In Milliken, there was no
evidence of discrimination by the affected suburban school districts. In Gautreaux
II, the court noted that the record contained evidence of suburban discrimination.
64
Finally, the court noted that both parties agreed that "the metropolitan area is
[the] single relevant locality for low rent housing purposes and that a city-only
remedy will not work.' 65 The court referred to numerous statements from both
parties demonstrating their support for a metropolitan-wide plan.66 For example,
HUD's General Counsel advocated for a metropolitan-wide plan, stating that "State
legislatures have determined that the city and its surrounding area comprise a single
60. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d at 936 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1440); Romney, 448 F.2d at 737-40).
61. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 3608(d)(5)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 937.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 11 indicates that of twelve suburban public housing
projects, ten were located in or adjacent to overwhelmingly black
census tracts. And although the case was not limited to public housing,
it is not irrelevant that we recently took judicial notice of widespread
residential segregation "in Chicago and its environs." Clark v. Ufiiversal
Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 335 (7th Cir. 1974). We went on to hold
that a prima facie showing had been made that this segregation had
discriminatory effects throughout the metropolitan area.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Seventh Circuit cited a CHA memorandum dated December 21, 1971:
CHA fully agrees that public housing must be metropolitan in nature,
and not confined to the City of Chicago. It has so stated on numerous
occasions before this court. It has offered testimony that a dispersal
program for public housing will not work unless it is operated on a
metropolitan basis.
Id. (citing R. Doc. 167, at 27). Similarly, the court cited a December 17, 1971 HUD
Memorandum which took a similar position:
[T]he impact of the concentration of the poor and minorities in the
central city extends beyond the city boundaries to include the
surrounding community. The City and the suburbs together make up
what I call the "real city." To solve problems of the "real city", only
metropolitan-wide solutions will do.
Id. (citing Statement by Secretary Romney, App. Z, at 15-16, to HUD's Mem., Dec. 17,
1971, R. Doc. 283, Attach. 6, Mem. 2, at 2) (alteration and emphasis in original).
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'locality' for low-rent housing purposes." 67 This determination was made because
the legislature realized that many cities cannot meet their low-rent housing needs
within the city limits. The elimination of slums and the creation of decent low-
income housing are metropolitan-wide problems, but of particular concern to
central cities where the impact of housing problems are most intense.
68
The court of appeals found no inherent reason for HUD to tie housing market
areas to arbitrary political boundaries. 69 The problems of the central city extended
beyond the city's borders and affected the surrounding community. Thus, the
solution to concentrated poverty needed to include all of the affected areas.7 °
The court also noted evidence of white flight and the migration of blacks into
the city.71 Samuel J. Simmons, former HUD Assistant Secretary for Equal
Opportunity, referred to this phenomenon as "the [w]hite noose around the
country's largest cities. 72 Simmons noted that "in the majority of the large
metropolitan areas [w]hite[s] and [b]lacks still live largely separate lives. 73 The
district judge himself predicted that unless patterns of racial separation were
reversed in Chicago, there would be little chance of undoing the intensifying
separation of whites and blacks in the city.74 The President's Commission on Civil
Disorders estimated that if the current trend of racial residential concentration
continued with blacks moving into and whites moving out of the central city,
blacks would account for fifty percent of Chicago's population by 1984.7' The
district judge added that "[b]y 1984 it may be too late to heal racial divisions. 76 An
expert in the case testified that white flight would be reduced if suburban areas
were desegregated.77 Simmons sought to explain the problem:
As [w]hites have left the cities, jobs have left with them. After 1960,
three-fifths of all new industrial plants constructed in this country were
outside of central cities. In some cases as much as 85% of all new
industrial plants located outside central cities were inaccessible to
[b]lacks and other minorities who swelled ghetto populations. 78
The court of appeals found these statements and views to "convey a solemn
warning.' 79 The court asserted that action must be taken to end a "vicious cycle of
poverty" that results in trapping poor, minority residents living in "jobless slums..
67. Id. (citing Pls.' Ex. 13, at 3-4).
68. Id. (citing Pls.' Ex. 13, at 3-4).
69. Id. at 938.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court noted that white flight caused similar problems in cities such as
Indianapolis, Indiana; Atlanta, Georgia; Washington, D.C.; and Cleveland, Ohio. Id.
72. Id. at 937 (citing Pls.' Ex. 7, at 3-4).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 938.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ill.
1969)).
77. Id. An expert demographer "testified that by providing desegregated housing
opportunities in the suburban areas, the rate of white exodus from the city would diminish."
Id.
78. Id. (citing Pls.' Ex. 9, at 3).
79. Id.
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. to lives of crime and violence."80 Based on these arguments for metropolitan-wide
relief, the court of appeals remanded the case and ordered the creation of a
metropolitan-wide plan to fulfill two goals. First, the court sought to formally
desegregate the public housing system in Chicago created from unconstitutional
site selection and tenant assignment procedures. Second, it sought to increase the
supply of dwelling units as quickly as possible in areas where blacks accounted for
less than thirty percent of the population.
8 1
After the appellate court order, HUD requested United States Supreme Court
review of the remedy in light of Milliken.82 The Court stated, "The relevant
geographic area for purposes of the respondents housing options is the Chicago
housing market, not the Chicago city limits."8 3 The Court ultimately affirmed the
lower court's remedy,84 marking the first time it authorized a desegregation plan to
extend beyond the community where the legal violation took place. 5
These decisions led to a metropolitan-wide consent decree. In 1981, fifteen
years after the original suit was filed, the district court approved a consent decree
between the plaintiffs and HUD. 86 This metropolitan-wide plan involved five
housing authorities in addition to the CHA. Unlike the 1969 judgment order
entered against the CHA, which divided Cook County into two areas (limited and
general), HUD's consent decree divides the Chicago Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area, composed of six counties, into three areas: general (less than thirty
percent minority population), limited (thirty percent or greater minority
population), and revitalizing (areas with substantial minority populations that are
undergoing redevelopment),.7
2. The Gautreaux Assisted-Housing Program
The 1981 consent decree created the Gautreaux Assisted-Housing Program
("GAHP"). 8 It provided for the placement of 7100 persons into assisted units in
80. Id.
81. Id. at 738-39.
82. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292 (1976).
83. Id. at 299.
84. Id. at 297-300 (holding metropolitan-wide relief against HUD was an appropriate
remedy for past discrimination); see also RUBINowrrz & ROSENBAUM, supra note 9, at 2.
Since scattered-site housing construction would be the type of remedy
that would impermissibly interfere with the operation of the local
governments, the ability to construct scattered-site housing was
significantly limited after Milliken.... Since Hills involved a different
governmental unit, [HUD], which has responsibility over housing
throughout the metropolitan area of Chicago, and a different remedy,
the use of Section 8 rental housing vouchers, instead of construction of
new housing, an interdistrict remedy was upheld.
Seliga, supra note 33, at 1061 n.65 (internal citations omitted).
85. See Hills, 425 U.S. at 305-06.
86. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 667-68, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd sub
nom., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 690 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 668-69.
88. Schuck, supra note 4, at 320.
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the general and revitalized areas. 89 GAHP utilized Section 8 vouchers, created by
Congress in 1974.90
Under Section 8, the public housing authority (here, the CHA) provides
vouchers to income-eligible families. Generally, the vouchers' value
equals the difference between 30% of family income and an agency-
prescribed payment standard defined as some percentage of the "fair
market rent" figure determined by the agency.
91
Families who were part of the Gautreaux plaintiff class and requested to
participate in the GAHP received Section 8 housing vouchers. 92 These vouchers
could be used in neighborhoods where less than thirty percent of the residents were
African-American.93 The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities
("Leadership Council"), a non-profit agency, assisted participants who searched for
housing in either diverse city neighborhoods or the suburbs. 94 The non-profit
agency offered counseling to prepare families for success in their new homes.
95
Between 1976 and 1998, the GAHP assisted more than 25,000 volunteers in
moving to over 100 communities throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.
96
Nearly half relocated to integrated suburbs and half to integrated neighborhoods in
the city. 97 The GAHP ended in 1998, when the court held that HUD had "satisfied
its court-ordered obligation to provide desegregated housing opportunities to 7100
families."
98
3. GAHP Outcomes
While some scholars question the courts' ability to affect and implement social
change, research suggests that the GAHP, created out of the court order in
Gautreaux v. Landrieu,99 did a remarkable job of promoting desegregation in
Chicago. 1° GAHP participants who moved to mostly white suburbs were better off
than those relocated into mostly black city neighborhoods. Longitudinal studies
89. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 669.
90. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(a),
88 Stat. 633, 653 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000)),
91. Schuck, supra note 4, at 320.
92. Id. at 320-21.
93. BPI, supra note 41.
94. See Schuck, supra note 4, at 321. The Leadership Council was chosen by HUD and
approved by the plaintiffs as the contractor to provide placement assistance. Landrieu, 523
F. Supp. at 668.
95. BPI, supra note 41.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 523 F. Supp. 665.
100. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at lv (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). See generally GERALD N. ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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documented the different experiences of GAHP suburban movers and city
movers.101
In the fall of 1998, when HUD's obligation to fund the GAHP
ended and the last relocation was completed, the program had moved
7100 low-income black families out of inner-city neighborhoods (over
90% black). Most participants moved to more than 100 suburban
communities (96% white, on average), and the rest (a comparison
group) moved to other neighborhoods within Chicago (99% black, on
average) that were demographically similar to the neighborhoods they
had left. In contrast, most families who left CHA housing with Section
8 vouchers but did not participate in the GAHP and, therefore, did not
receive mobility counseling, ended up moving to other black, high-
poverty neighborhoods.1
0 2
The suburban movers lived in communities with less crime and violence, but
experienced a higher risk of racist encounters. 10 3 The victims of these encounters
characterized them as upsetting, infrequent, and non-violent.1°4 During the first
year after relocation, suburban movers initially experienced more harassment than
did city movers. However, after the first year, the two groups experienced similar
levels of harassment and social integration. 1
05
The suburbs also offered a better educational environment. Suburban schools
were safer, had smaller class sizes, and provided higher educational standards.
106
While this resulted in long-term benefits to the students, in the short term, many, 107
students found that they had difficultly meeting their new school's expectations.
[C]hildren of suburban movers were more likely than their city
counterparts to be in high school, on a college track, in a four-year
college, in a job, and in a job with benefits. Nonetheless, they had very
similar rates of behavior problems, similar grades, and similar class
ranks. Given the much higher standards the suburban movers faced,
however, this ostensible equivalence probably reflects a higher level of
performance.1
0 8
Encouraged by the apparent outcomes of the GAHP suburban movers, "Federal
policy has ...marshall[ed] Section 8 as the programmatic vehicle for almost all
new assistance since the mid-1980s."'
1 9
101. See Schuck, supra note 4, at 321. See generally RuBiNowrrz & ROSENBAUM,
supra note 9.
102. Schuck, supra note 4, at 321 (citing William P. Wilen & Wendy L. Stasell,
Gautreaux and Chicago's Public Housing Crisis: The Conflict Between Achieving
Integration and Providing Decent Housing for Very Low-Income African Americans, 34
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 117, 126 nn.79-82 (2000)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 321-22.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 322.
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The success of mobility programs is based on the assertion that neighborhoods
affect those who live in them. The outcomes reported for those participating in the
GAHP have been recreated in other studies. The "presence of middle-class,
affluent, and professional-managerial neighbors [is] positively related to
educational attainment and negatively related to school drop-out."" l
0
These results suggest that neighborhoods influence children and
adolescents through the resources they have to offer. Possible
explanations for the benefits of middle-class neighborhoods include: the
presence of adult role models committed to the labor force; the presence
of peers whose families share values and have high educational
aspirations; the number and quality of neighborhood and community
organizations, including schools; a variety of amenities such as
playgrounds, recreational facilities, and libraries; and the availability of
supervised youth activities.I I I
A non-profit agency provides one explanation for why mixed-income communities
are a valuable objective of housing policy:
[O]ne of public housing's greatest obstacles is its isolated concentration
of poor people, a phenomenon that destroys the norms of everyday life
and perpetuates social and economic deprivation. Many argue that
economic integration through the presence of higher-income tenants can
contribute to a more stable environment by exposing public housing
residents to role models and the linkages they bring to the broader
community.112
Since Section 8's inception in 1974,113 there has been widespread support for
vouchers to replace traditional public housing. Currently, nearly 1.7 million
households nationwide participate in the Section 8 program.114 Some researchers
suggest that "voucher and certificate programs work better and are less expensive
than public housing and other forms of project-based assistance."'"15 A study by the
General Accounting Office confirms this statement, reporting "that the total per-
unit costs for housing production programs are from 32 to 59 percent greater than
110. See Martha A. Gephart, Neighborhoods and Communities as Contexts for
Development, in 1 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES FOR CHILDREN
1, 42 (Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al. eds., 1997) (citing studies that control for family status and
background).
111. Id.
112. Bennett, supra note 14, at 60 (quoting METROPOLITAN PLANNING COUNCIL,
CHANGING THE PARADIGM: A CALL FOR NEW APPROACHES TO PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN REGION 15 (Oct. 1996)). Bennett uses this "nonprofit planning
organization's report on public housing reforms [to] represent[] one of the more sustained
explanations of why mixed-income communities represent a worthwhile objective for
neighborhood planning efforts." Id. at 59.
113. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(a),
88 Stat. 633, 653 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000)).
114. CUNNINGHAM & POPKIN, supra note 3, at 1.
115. E.g., WEICHER, supra note 8, at 43.
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for housing vouchers in the first year and from 12 to 27 percent greater over 30
years." 116
HUD's HOPE VI 17 and HCV programs indicate that creating mixed-income
communities is a goal of the federal government. This goal is based on the premise
that neighborhoods affect those who live in them. However, "[d]ispersing the poor
will only command majority support if most people believe that it will improve
poor neighborhoods a lot more than it will harm more affluent ones."'" 8 For this
perception to prevail, the public's image of public housing residents must be
transformed. Part Two of this Note addresses some of the barriers and institutions
that reinforce negative perceptions of public housing residents. If these barriers are
not overcome, HCV recipients will not have the opportunity to move to low-
poverty areas. It is not enough for HCV programs to relocate past public housing
residents from publicly run to privately owned and operated units when both are
located in isolated, poor, minority communities.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATED HOUSING
Often HCV programs' goal of relocating families to low-poverty and areas is
frustrated by individual, community, and programmatic barriers. Critics of HCV
programs argue that the positive outcomes of voucher programs are overstated. For
example, Richard Ford asserts that local governments have both the means and the
incentive to restrict land use in a way that excludes low-income housing and thus
voucher recipients. He argues that traditional Gautreaux programs "demand[] that
these socially isolated poor not only develop a work ethic and mainstream social
skills sufficient to win them jobs in the private sector of a middle-class suburb, but
also that they do so while simultaneously acculturating themselves to a new social
milieu." 119 A person facing more individual, community, and programmatic
barriers and possessing fewer resources will likely have a difficult time attempting
116. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-901R COSTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE 4 (2001), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01901r.pdf (last
visited May 18, 2004).
117. HOPE VI grants are awarded by HUD to public housing authorities with severely
distressed public housing units. They are used for four main purposes. First, the grants can
be used to rehabilitate existing public housing projects by changing the physical shape of the
building or for demolition of severely distressed public housing. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AND
INDIAN HOUSING, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., ABOUT HOPE VI (2003), at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).
Second, they can be used to empower residents and promote self-sufficiency through support
service programs. Id. Third, the grants can be used to acquire new sites for construction in
order to "plac[e] public housing in nonpoverty neighborhoods and promote mixed-income
communities." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, HOPE VI grants can fund partnerships with
other agencies. Id.
118. Christopher Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, The Social Consequences of Growing Up
in a Poor Neighborhood, in INNER-CrrY POvERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 111, 122 (Laurence
E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G.H. McGeany eds., 1990).
119. Richard Ford, Down by Law, 25 BOSTON REv. 11 (2000), available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR25.3/ford.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2004) (alterations
added) (emphasis in original). This portion of Ford's argument highlights the economic and
social challenges families face after they have relocated. For the purposes of this Note, I
focus specifically on challenges to making the original move to mixed-income communities.
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to move into an economically viable community. While these barriers relate to
housing segregation in general, the experiences of displaced Chicago public
housing residents are highlighted.
A. Individual Barriers
The transition from publicly owned and operated housing to private rental
units can be difficult. "Although some public-housing residents displaced by
redevelopment move into replacement housing, are successful in procuring private
housing through certificates or vouchers, or move in with family members; others
move to other ghettos, become homeless, or simply disappear." 120 Many displaced
public housing residents face unique challenges that must be overcome to
successfully transition to the private market. Like all of us, each public housing
resident faces unique individual barriers to maintaining self-sufficiency. For public
housing residents, however, personal problems and the social costs of relocation
may make it impractical to relocate to a new neighborhood. While these barriers
are unique to each individual, the next Part provides examples of what some of
these personal challenges may include.
1. Personal Challenges
Many long-term public housing residents have personal problems that prevent
them from becoming self-sufficient. In Chicago, many CHA tenants are dependent
on welfare and unemployed. 21 Most of the developments are extremely dangerous
and some residents have experienced traumatic events, such as witnessing or being
the victim of a violent crime, that will affect them even after moving. 122 Gang- and
drug-related crime is prevalent.1
23
Many households include one or more members with a criminal record. 124
When a family member has a criminal record it may be harder for that family to
relocate following the passage of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act
of 1998.125 This federal law allows the CHA to evict or refuse to relocate public
120. Kristen D.A. Carpenter, Promise Enforcement in Public Housing: Lessons from
Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1073, 1105 (2002) (footnotes omitted); see
also Jennifer Hochschild, Creating Options, 25 BOSTON REv. 14-15 (2000), available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR25.3/hochschild.html (arguing for voluntary relocation but,
at the same time, making the situation more livable for those residents who remain in the
housing project).
121. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 47.
122. See J. GARBARINO ET AL., NO PLACE TO BE A CHILD: GROWING UP IN A WAR ZONE
(1991) (comparing growing up in a Chicago public housing development with growing up in
a war zone).
123. SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., THE HIDDEN WAR: CRIME AND THE TRAGEDY OF PUBLIC
HOUSING IN CHICAGO 157-58 (2000). Living with extreme violence can cause lasting trauma,
anxiety, and depression, and have profound effects on a child's development. SUSAN J.
POPKIN & MARY K. CUNNINGHAM, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, SEARCHING FOR RENTAL HOUSING
WITH SECTION 8 IN THE CHICAGO REGION 17 (2000).
124. See POPKIN ET AL., supra note 123, at 4.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000). The statute states:
[T]hat any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related
criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public
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housing residents or potential residents who use illegal drugs, abuse alcohol,
commit violent crimes, or participate in criminal activity to the detriment of other
residents or employees of public housing.' 26 The Act has been called the "one-
strike" policy. 127 It requires the CHA "to utilize lease provisions in which the
tenant assumes responsibility for the criminal activity of his or her guests and
household members." 128 In Department of Housing & Urban Development v.
Rucker,'29 the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the CHA and other public
housing authorities to "evict tenants for the drug activity of household members
and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the
activity. ' 13° Thus, fewer families are eligible for relocation as the number ofindividuals ineligible for public housing increases.'31
2. Social Costs of Relocation
Relocated tenants often miss their old public housing community. Residents
report attachment to their home even if it was unsafe and stigmatized. 3 2 One major
loss is the disintegration of social and economic networks that many families
developed to help make ends meet. 133 For example, members of expanded kin
networks may benefit from a collective give and take relationship that distributes
scarce resources. Members may be expected to assume responsibility for others in
the network even when this causes an extra burden to the provider.' 34 For example,
families-particularly single mothers-may have a relationship with other mothers
to share childcare responsibilities. Public housing residents may be disconnected
from needed social services after they move into a private apartment because the
process of providing these services has not been streamlined outside the traditional
housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or
other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of
tenancy.
126. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1063 n.79.
127. SoCheung Lee, Serving the Invisible and the Many: U.S. Supreme Court Upholds
the Rucker One-Strike Policy, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 415, 415
(2002).
128. Id.
129. 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
130. Lee, supra note 127, at 415 (citing Rucker, 535 U.S. at 127-28).
131. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1063.
132. See POPKIN ET AL., supra note 123, at 118.
133. KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 149-53. (1997). Edin and Lein detail the expenses
that single mothers face and how they manage to survive on a substandard AFDC budget. Id.
at 23-56. These mothers' limited decisions on how to acquire supplementary income often
mediated their decision to accept low wage work or to receive AFDC. See id. at 141-42.
Some mothers relied on other family members, boyfriends, or the father of their children for
support. Id. at 149-67. When domestic support was unavailable the mothers often relied on
the informal economy for jobs. Id. at 172-78. The informal economy includes all earnings
from unreported income from otherwise legal activities as well as any income from illegal
activities. Id. Some women received help from churches or private charities. Id. at 178-80.
The neighborhood that the mothers lived in often affected their survival strategy. Id. at 184.
134. See CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMN rrY, 90-94 (1974).
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public housing setting.' 35 Although public housing residents are not often thought
of as having a great deal of political clout, it is arguable that relocated tenants face
political dilution from the dispersion of public-housing residents. 136 When tenants
live in concentrated public housing they are often in the same voting district. It is
more likely that a political candidate will address issues important to the tenants as
a group when they are a larger portion of the electorate and perhaps more visible.
137
B. Community Barriers
"Using the law to promote diversity in residential communities is probably
more difficult than promoting it in any other public policy domain.' '138 In the end,
private housing means private choices. These individual choices result, when
aggregated, in collective action and often segregation. In his article Judging
Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 139 Peter Schuck describes
how racial prejudice, classism, white flight, and traditional residential clustering
are likely to contribute to racial segregation and isolation.14° Next, this Note uses
Schuck's four factors to discuss how factors contributing to racial segregation and
isolation influence a voucher holder's experience locating an apartment.
1. Racism
Both public policy and private actors reinforce racial prejudice. The practices
of private developers, brokers, and housing consumers explain some segregation.1
4
'
Prejudice also partly explains why "[n]eighborhoods in which blacks live both in
the central city and in the suburbs have lower socioeconomic status than those in
which comparable whites live."'142 Research suggests that whites have tried to
"thwart, prevent, and deter" blacks from moving into neighborhoods that whites
consider to be theirs. 14 3 Throughout the twentieth century, deep-seated racial
prejudice led whites to try to expel blacks moving into their neighborhood through
"thousands of small acts of terrorism."' 44 In his book, Stephen Meyer records
criminal activity targeting minorities who move into majority white neighborhoods
135. Carpenter, supra note 120, at 1108.
136. See id. at 1112.
137. See id.
138. Schuck, supra note 4, at 289.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 295.
141. See generally JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS OPPORTUNIFEs LOST: THE
CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION (1995).
142. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 25 (citing John R. Logan et al., Minority
Access to White Suburbs: A Multiregional Comparison, 74 Soc. FORCES 851 (1996)).
143. Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment: White
Neighbors' Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 335 (Fall
2001/Winter 2002) (reviewing STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG As THEY DON'T MOVE
NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (2000));
see also JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE
CRIMES 28-47 (2002) (illustrating how hate crimes are used to threaten and deter minority
residents who move into largely white neighborhoods).
144. Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 143, at 337 (quoting MEYER, supra note 143, at
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"and the failure, by and large, of the criminal justice system to arrest, prosecute,
convict, and punish the perpetrators of these race-based crimes."'145 Other
commentators have agreed. For example:
In 1990 the Joneses, a [b]lack family, moved into a house in a mostly
working-class [w]hite neighborhood in St. Paul, Minnesota. In the first
month after the Joneses moved in the tires of their car were slashed. The
second month, the tailgate of their brand new station wagon was broken.
A few weeks later, a young [wihite man called the Joneses son a
"nigger" as he was walking down their street. Three months after they
moved in a large cross was burned in their front yard. Later the same
night, another cross was burned in front of their apartment building
across the street from their house. As one of very few [b]lack families in
the neighborhood, the Joneses were frightened and felt very vulnerable.
The local police to whom they turned for protection did little to
help them.146
As was the case for the Joneses, attacks are frequently aimed at black owners.
"Middle-class status based on education and income offered no protection against
racial crimes."' 47 Voucher holders that relocate into mostly white neighborhoods
may face "reactive hate crimes]" similar to those experienced by the the
Joneses."18 These racist acts may directly affect former minority public housing
residents as they are victimized by those who fear their "entrance into a previously
homogenous area.'
49
Voucher recipients also struggle with real or perceived discrimination. Many
potential renters do not consider housing in a particular neighborhood because they
perceive they are unwelcome. 150 Other families, particularly families with
teenagers, do experience explicit discrimination.' 5' Landlords appear to fear that
teenagers (particularly black men) pose a greater risk to their property. 152 On
occasion, neighborhood residents complain that voucher recipients are responsible
for increased crime and social disorder. 53 Often, investigations of these complaints
145. Id. at 337.
146. BELL, supra note 143, at 28. This is just one example from Bell's book of a
"reactive hate crime" or a crime motivated "by the personal threat posed by outsiders'
entrance into a previously homogenous area." Id. at 22.
147. Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 143, at 339.
148. BELL, supra note 143, at 22.
149. Id.
150. TuRNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 33. For example, voucher recipients may have
heard of other families' racist encounters when they moved into a new neighborhood. The
Chicago Tribune reported that six families who moved into scattered-site units in a majority
Latino neighborhood asked to be relocated when they encountered various forms of
harassment and intimidation. Flynn McRoberts, Move from CHA High-Rise Can Involve a
Leap of Faith, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1998, at Al.
151. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 33.
152. See id. at 33, 34.
153. See id. at 15; see, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, A Neighborhood Slams the Door;
Racist Acts Drive Philadelphia Family Out of White Area, WASH. POST, May 18, 1996, at
A01 (This article tells the story of Bridget Ward who moved into a white working-class
neighborhood with her family. Beginning the night of her arrival, her home was vandalized
and her family threatened because of their race.).
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find that the accused was not a voucher recipient. 154 These false claims may
"reflect racial prejudice or fears about racial change in the neighborhood.' ' 55
2. Classism
A voucher holder may also face classism, which is "discrimination on the basis
of wealth, income, social class, or perceived ability to pay."'156 These biases seem
almost natural in a capitalist society.157 Perhaps this is why government efforts to
move persons into neighborhoods they could not otherwise afford on their own
creates intense resistance.' 58 This opposition is triggered by the current residents'
concern for their family, children, and property. 159 Practically, however, it is
difficult to distinguish between racism and classism because race and income are
highly correlated. 160 There has been great public resistance when courts rely on
"the nondiscrimination principle" (a negative right) to create diverse residential
neighborhoods through "an affirmative judicial mandate" targeting neighborhoods
committed to classism.16 1 Thus, as a society we can believe that integration is
important but shirk this ideal when it conflicts with our personal interest in keeping
our neighborhood isolated.
3. White Flight
The third contributor to segregation is white flight. White flight is a pattern of
behavior related to both racism and classism. Economist Thomas Schelling
demonstrated how individual choices transform small differences in group attitudes
about neighborhood diversity into relatively high levels of segregation.' 62 Under
Schelling's model "[u]nless blacks and whites do not have any preferences about
neighborhood composition or their preferences happen to converge on the identical
154. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
155. Id.
156. Schuck, supra note 4, at 294.
157. Id. at 301-02. Schuck argues that in the U.S., classism is supported by government
policies in so far as the federal government spends at least "twice as much on the mortgage
interest deduction as on all housing programs for the poor, such as Section 8 rental vouchers
and public housing." Id. at 302 (citing CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE
STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 27-28 (1997)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 294.
160. Id. at 302.
161. Id. at 294. For example, the N.J. Supreme Court took this approach in Mount
Laurel, New Jersey where the court "invoked a principle it created out of whole cloth" that
all people should have access to suburban communities regardless of their ability to pay.
This finding has found little political or moral support. See id. (referring to S. Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), and S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983)). Similarly, in Yonkers, New York the District
Court's decision to require diversity as a remedy for past wrongs resulted in a costly struggle
between the community and judge. Id. (citing United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 518 F.
Supp. 191 (D.C.N.Y. 1981)).
162. See id. at 297.
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integration level, the unraveling process will ensue and segregated housing patterns
will persist or even grow."
' 163
Most blacks would generally like to live in a neighborhood that is fifty percent
black, a neighborhood that most whites would move away from, resulting in a
neighborhood that is close to one hundred percent black. 164 Critics of the
Gautreaux model of integration might argue that integration created by scattering a
small number of black families throughout white neighborhoods, is illegitimate
because it presumes all blacks want to live in majority white neighborhoods. 65
Homeowners in a neighborhood with an influx of voucher holders may feel
pressure to move to another neighborhood based on anxieties "aris[ing] out of their
predictions about how the independent choices of their existing neighbors will
affect them, their children, their neighborhood, their vulnerability to crime, and
their property values." 166 Property values are one measure of a neighborhood's
well-being and stability.167 The perception that voucher recipients will bring crime
and disruptive behavior may raise residents' concerns of declining property
values.' 68 However, the concern with declining property values is linked with race
and class bias.
Under this model, one would anticipate that all middle-class persons-black
and white-would resist the building of a housing project near their homes or the
in-migration of poor people. 169 One real-world example has borne this theory out,
the CHA's scattered-site housing program. The scattered-site program was met
with great resistance from persons of all races when the city looked to place units
in their neighborhood. 170 Perhaps, then, this nattern of behavior is better described
as middle-class flight instead of white flight.'
163. Id. at 297-98.
164. Id. at 298. This figure was based on the results of a survey. NATHAN GLAZER, WE
ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now 40 (1997).
165. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1067.
166. Schuck, supra note 4, at 300. See, e.g., Tod Robberson, Hard Feelings Over
Subsidized Housing in Mount Vernon, WASH. PosT, Apr. 20, 1996, Final Edition, at AO1. In
Mount Vernon, Virginia, there is a division between families receiving housing vouchers
and "area homeowners, who say their suburban world of $100,000 to $500,000 housing is
threatened by the steady encroachment of housing for the poor." Id. One homeowner is
working to have his neighbor, a voucher recipient, evicted.
[Slince some of his neighbors began renting to welfare recipients a few
years ago, drug activity and other disruptive behavior have increased in
the complex. "My quality of life has plummeted. My property value has
suffered. I can't sell my property as long as I have people on assisted
housing living next door."
Id.
167. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 16.
168. Id. at 16-17.
169. Schuck, supra note 4, at 300.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
171. Compare this with note 22, supra, describing a case in which black aldermen did
not resist siting housing in their districts. This may be attributed to the black districts in the
city already being poorer and the location of substandard housing. However, the "middle-
class flight" argument assumes that black suburban residents would resist the influx of poor
residents. As such, class is an independent issue. Race is also an independent issue when
whites resist even middle-class blacks moving in, but class, not race, is the focus of
subsidized housing.
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4. Clustering
Of the four factors, clustering appears the most benign cause of segregation.
"Ethnic groups in the United States have always clustered together in enclaves until
they felt comfortable in the dominant culture-but they have also clustered
afterwards to some extent." 172 "[Gleographic clustering may simply reflect the
original locations of the[] families" because individuals want to live close to their
friends, family, and social networks. 173 Clustering may also arise from "seemingly
neutral market factors," 174 such as "access to services and availability of public
transportation." 1
75
While Section 8 recipients are more geographically dispersed than are public
housing residents, in suburban Chicago the majority of voucher recipients are
located in the southern suburbs. 176 This makes sense if racially mixed or
predominately minority neighborhoods are more "open and welcoming to minority
[voucher] recipients" than are white neighborhoods. 77 For example, an African
American is most likely to find housing with her voucher in a weak housing
market. 178 This can lead to geographical clustering in higher-poverty and higher-
minority neighborhoods. 179 At the same time, these communities "are particularly
vulnerable to being destabilized by an influx of poor households or by incomers
who are disruptive of behavioral norms."'
180
It seems natural that CHA tenants may want to live near family and friends and
may be more likely to consider living in a neighborhood where they know a current
resident. Critics of forced integration, such as John Calmore, argue that "[flair
housing must be reconceptualized to mean not only increased opportunity for
blacks to move beyond their socio-territorial disadvantage but also to mean
enhanced choice to overcome opportunity-denying circumstances while continuing
to live in black communities."' 81 Critics like Calmore suggest that low-income
African-American families should be able to choose to live in a community with a
largely African-American population. They are less concerned with racial
integration than with creating mixed-income communities.
Racism, classism, white flight, and clustering are all factors that make it
difficult for voucher holders to have a true choice in locating a neighborhood that
best suits their preferences. Voucher holders may have limited opportunity to move
into mostly white neighborhoods because of real or perceived racial discrimination.
Some may even face "reactive hate crime[s].' 82 Current residents of a
172. Schuck, supra note 4, at 296.
173. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 39.
174. Schuck, supra note 4, at 296.
175. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 39.
176. Id. at 9 (citing PAUL FISCHER, SECTION 8 AND THE PUBLIC HOUSING REVOLUTION:
WHERE WILL THE FAMILIES Go? (1999)).
177. Id. at 25.
178. Id. at 24.
179. Id. at 24-25.
180. Id. at 25 (citation omitted); Mary E. Pattillo, Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers:
Managing Crime in a Black Middle-Class Neighborhood. 76 SoC. FORCES 747 (1998).
181. John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kemer Commission Report: A Back-to-
the-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1495 (1993).
182. BELL, supra note 141, at 22 ("Reactive hate crimes are motivated by the personal
threat posed by outsiders' entrance into a previously homogenous area.").
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neighborhood with an influx of voucher holders may feel pressure to move based
on fear that their current neighbors will leave and more voucher holders will enter
causing the neighborhood crime rate to increase and their property value to
decline. 83 These factors are particularly difficult to address because they are all
based on individual choices that result, when aggregated, in collective action and
often segregation. Next this Note addresses obstacles, put in place by the voucher
program itself, that recipients must overcome to locate homes that best suit their
needs.
C. Programmatic Barriers
At the most general level, advocates of HCV programs assume that the private
rental market is a cheaper and more effective way of providing housing to low-
income families than public housing. However, for this assumption to be true, there
must be enough landlords in middle-class or affluent neighborhoods willing to rent
units to voucher holders. At the moment, a shortage of low-income housing strains
this assumption.
1. Landlords
The supply of low-income apartment units is dwindling, in part, because
"many owners of private rental properties .. .are leaving the federal housing
voucher program."' 184 Landlords with property in higher-value neighborhoods have
little incentive to accept housing vouchers. 185 They have no problem locating
tenants able to pay the full market value on their own and may want to avoid the
extra administrative work required to accept the voucher. 186 Even landlords who
regularly accept voucher recipients may view public housing residents as
"undesirable" and too risky. 187 If landlords in desirable locations refuse to rent to
voucher recipients, then the program will fail. The positive benefits of voucher
programs depend upon low-income housing being available in middle- and upper-
class neighborhoods.
However, landlords in lower-value neighborhoods have an incentive to accept
the vouchers because they provide a guaranteed stream of rent.'8 8 This makes it
easier for voucher holders to find an apartment in a lower-income neighborhood
than it is to find a unit in a better-off neighborhood. In some cases, housing
183. Schuck, supra note 4 at 300.
184. Rochelle E. Lento, What Does the Future Hold for Affordable Housing &
Community Development Under the Bush Administration?, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 170, 171 (2001). See, e.g., Stephanie A. Crockett, Portsmouth Helps
Tenants Find Homes but Few Landlords Accept Families in Aid Program, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(Norfolk, Va.), July 7, 2000, at B 1. The Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority
"is required to help residents relocate as part of a settlement agreement" finalized in the U.S.
Eastern District of Virginia. Id. The mobility program is working to help move families out
of a 160-unit building contaminated with lead. Id. A major challenge to relocation has been
the lack of landlords willing to rent units to voucher recipients. Id.
185. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 24.
186. Id. at 24, 33.
187. Id. at 48.
188. Id. at 24.
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vouchers may help stabilize a neighborhood. 189 Landlords who accept housing
vouchers must keep their unit up to "housing quality standards."' 90 These standards
often require improvements that have the potential to increase property values.1
91
However, the goal of voucher programs should be to move public housing tenants
into economically advantaged neighborhoods. Landlords in economically viable
communities must be recruited to the voucher program so that the costs of
searching for an apartment (such as time, transportation costs,' 92 and
disappointment at being denied an apartment) in economically viable
neighborhoods are not significantly higher than the costs of finding an apartment in
high-poverty areas more familiar to displaced CHA tenants.
2. Low-Income Housing Stock
Across the nation, there is a shortage of low-income housing and a dwindling
supply of low-income apartment units. This is due, in part, to the demolition of
public housing projects and their "revitalization with fewer units."' 193 "[O]ne
million families in forty cities are on waiting lists for public housing or rent
subsidies and ... waiting times have increased drastically."' 194 The hardship faced
by families on the waiting list is aggravated by the reduction of government owned
public housing units. During the Clinton administration, one hundred thousand
dilapidated public housing units were demolished. 95 The one-for-one replacement
requirement, mandating that every destroyed unit be replaced, has been
abolished. 196 "[F]ederal law now permits replacement housing to take the form of
189. Id. at 23-24. For example, Alex Schwartz describes how New York City used
vouchers "as de facto operating subsidies for some of the projects it helped finance." Id. at
24. He argues that when used this way, Section 8 vouchers "increase[] a development's rent
roll, enabling owners to better maintain the property, provide additional services, build up
reserves, and tolerate higher operating costs for vacancy and arrearage losses." Id. (citation
omitted).
190. Id. at 23-24. To "aid[] low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and
[to] promot[e] economically mixed housing," housing quality standards ("HQS") are
established by the Secretary. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437f(a), f(o)(8)(B). "[L]ocal housing codes or
. . . codes adopted by a public housing agency" can be used instead of the HQS as long as
the local or adopted codes "meet or exceed" the HQS established by the Secretary. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(8)(B). The HQS can be found at 24 C.F.R. § 982.401. "[C]riteria for..
• key aspects of housing quality" such as: sanitary facilities, food preparation and refuse
disposal, space and security, thermal environment, illumination and electricity, structure and
materials, interior air quality, water supply, lead-based paint, access, site and neighborhood
sanitary condition, and smoke detectors are expounded. 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2003).
191. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 23-24.
192. People being relocated from public housing usually rely on public transportation
which makes "searching for housing... time-consuming and costly." Id.
193. Schuck, supra note 4, at 322 (citation omitted); see also TURNER ET AL., supra note
10, at 9.
194. Lento, supra note 184, at 171 (citing a 1999 report by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development).
195. Id.
196. Carpenter, supra note 120, at 1105 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
RELOCATION AND EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS: DRAFT
RECOMMENDATIONS ON RELOCATION GUIDANCE FOR THE HOPE VI PROGRAM 3 (2000)).
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other project-based or tenant-based assistance, such as Section 8 vouchers and
certificates, in addition to 'hard' public-housing units."'197 Incentives are needed for
new low-income housing stock to be developed.
Historically, zoning and land-use regulations have been used to limit rental
housing in wealthy suburbs. 198 Therefore, most rental units are "concentrated in
central cities, older suburbs, and less-affluent neighborhoods."'1 99 Because it is
difficult for voucher recipients to find moderately priced rental housing in affluent
communities, their placement may reflect the distribution of affordable rental
housing.
200
There is concern that the demolition of public housing stock will flood the
housing market with displaced public housing residents, and voucher holders will
not have time to find an apartment in a desirable neighborhood.2 °1 Currently
families who receive a voucher have sixty days to find an appropriate apartment.
20 2
The HCV administrator can allow additional time if needed. 03 "Large families
with children seem to have a particularly difficult time because of the limited
availability of three- and four-bedroom units in the private rental market."
20 4
Understanding the barriers that families moving from public housing to the
private market with HCVs face is important. Part Three considers government
programs that could be used to mitigate these challenges, which may reduce the
chance that Ford's prediction will come to fruition that only the relatively strong
will succeed, thus leaving behind a super-underclass. 205 In the next Part, I argue
that HCV programs must have services in place to help recipients overcome the
personal, community, and programmatic barriers they face. Without these
programs, the choices of HCV participants will remain limited and our
neighborhoods segregated. HCV programs should focus on relief for the entire
metropolitan area and moving public housing residents into low-poverty areas.
III. CURRENT HCV PROGRAMS' ABILITY TO PROMOTE DESEGREGATION
A. The Demolition of CHA Property and the Displacement of Tenants
Currently in Chicago and across the nation, large numbers of families are using
rent subsidies to move from dilapidated high-rise public housing into privately
206
owned apartments. Mismanagement and substandard living conditions in CHA
high-rises led the federal government to take over the CHA in 1995.207 HUD placed
197. Carpenter, supra note 120, at 1106 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
supra note 196, at 3); see also Bennett, supra note 14, at 54-55.
198. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 31.
199. Id. (citing MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY STABILITY (1997)).
200. See id. at 31.
201. See id. at 48.
202. 24 C.F.R. § 982.303 (2003).
203. Id.
204. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 47.
205. Ford, supra note 119.
206. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 45.
207. SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATEsH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A
MODERN GHETTO 265 (2000). There are fifteen housing authorities across the nation that
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the CHA in receivership and formed a new interim management team.2" 8 In 1996,
Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act
20 9
requiring local housing authorities to conduct "viability assessments" to determine
if the existing public housing units should be rehabilitated or demolished.210 A
development was to be demolished if the cost of rehabilitation exceeded the cost of
demolishing the unit and providing all current tenants with housing vouchers.
211
Nearly 19,000 CHA units, including almost all of its high-rises, failed the test.
212
The CHA and HUD are not responsible for replacing these "hard units. 21 3
In June of 1999, HUD withdrew its oversight of the CHA, and four months
later, the CHA released its "Plan for Transformation." 21 4 The plan called for a
thirty-three percent reduction in CHA housing stock, demolition of nearly all high-
rise apartment buildings, and rehabilitation or construction of almost 25,000
have gone into receivership since 1979. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUBLIC HOUsING: INFORMATION ON RECEIVERSHIPS AT PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES 1
(2003) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03363.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
During receivership, outside parties are given the power to manage the housing authorities.
Id. Receiverships usually arise as a last resort from "long-standing, severe, and persistent
management problems that led to deterioration of the housing stock." Id. at 2. Four housing
authorities' judicial receiverships arose out of lawsuits: Boston Housing Authority, Chester
Housing Authority, Housing Authority of Kansas City, and District of Columbia Housing
Authority. Id. at 7. The other eleven receiverships were administrative and covered:
Beaumont Housing Authority (TX), Camden Housing Authority (NJ), Chicago Housing
Authority (IL), East St. Louis Housing Authority (IL), Lafayette Housing Authority (LA),
Housing Authority of New Orleans (LA), Orange County Housing Authority (TX), St.
James Parish Housing Authority (LA), San Francisco Housing Authority (CA), Springfield
Housing Authority (IL), and Wellston Housing Authority (MO). Id. at 6-7.
208. VENKATESH, supra note 207, at 265.
209. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-5 (2000). The test applied to developments with more than 300
units and vacancy rates of ten percent or more. Bennett, supra note 14, at 54; see also
POPKIN Er AL., supra note 123, at 8 (indicating that the new law has "made it easier for
housing authorities to demolish and redevelop their worst properties").
211. Bennett, supra note 14, at 54. The demolition of concentrated public housing
projects is not a new idea. In July 1972, the first three public housing buildings of St. Louis's
Pruitt-Igoe were dynamited. Elizabeth Birmingham, Refraining the Ruins: Pruitt-Igoe,
Structural Racism, and African American Rhetoric as a Space for Cultural Critique, 63 W.
J. COMM. 291, 291 (1999).
212. POPKIN ET AL., supra note 123, at 8; see also High-Rise Housing Tumbles, ENR
(Engineering News Record), March 20, 1995, at 19. The demolition of the Robert Taylor
Homes is part of a plan developed out of the legal settlement with Henry Homer Homes'
residents, who sued the CHA and HUD in 1991 for failing to properly maintain and fund the
housing projects. Id.
213. [The 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act abolished the
one-for-one unit replacement commitment (which had been suspended
by previous legislation), increased the percentage of working poor
families that might dwell in public housing developments, and
"allow[ed] a PHA to use funds flexibly . . . for mixed financed
projects."
Bennett, supra note 14, at 54-55 (quoting Jerry J. Salama, The Redevelopment of Distressed
Public Housing: Early Results from HOPE VI Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San
Antonio, 10 HOUS. POL'Y DEBATE 95, 97 (1999)).
214. Id. at 58 (The plan was approved by HUD in early February 2000.).
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apartments. 21 5 The CHA wanted to shift from an "'owner and manager of public
housing' to a 'facilitator of housing opportunities.'
21 6
B. HCV Programs for Displaced CHA Tenants
Vouchers are the central strategy for providing replacement housing to
residents whose housing units failed the viability assessment and will be
demolished. The CHA estimates that nearly 6150 households will need to be
relocated with Section 8 vouchers due to the demolitions between 1999 and
2004.217 However, the current voucher program is significantly different from the
GAHP. Since 1998, the courts have not supervised HCV programs to ensure that
integration occurs as the vouchers are used.218 The Gautreaux litigation's focus on
desegregation is still necessary today. The metropolitan-wide goal of relocating
public housing residents to low-poverty, low-minority neighborhoods should be
continued because it is essential to achieving integration.
In October 2002, the CHA had approximately 26,000 vouchers available.219 It
was hoped that vouchers would reduce concentrations of poverty and increase
housing choice throughout the metropolitan area. 220 However, there are growing
concerns that "former public housing residents may be clustering in poor
neighborhoods not far from their original developments. 22 ' If true, vouchers will
not meet one of their central goals: dispersing public housing residents throughout
the metropolitan area and reducing overall racial segregation in the city.
The Leadership Council, Housing Choice Services, and CHAC administer
three of the current voucher programs. When GAHP ended in 1998, the Leadership
Council (which provided the counseling and mobility services to GAHP recipients)
continued to provide their services in relocating CHA tenants.2 22 "In 2001, the
agency was commissioned to create a new Gautreaux-type program for people who
wish to move to low-poverty neighborhoods.
'
"
223
Housing Choice Services administers a mobility program in the Cook County
suburbs, and CHAC Inc. is the private corporation responsible for the HCV
program in Chicago. CHAC uses "individual counseling, life-skills training,
landlord negotiation seminars, neighborhood tours, and a security deposit loan
assistance program--to foster moves to low-poverty, low-minority
neighborhoods. 224 CHAC has an annual budget of $2.1 million and serves nearly
1000 households. 225 Even with these resources, an Urban Institute study found that
CHAC participants still struggled to find a home with their housing voucher. At
least half of the respondents reported concerns about finding an affordable
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION 4 (2000)).
217. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1080 n.156 (citing CHICAGO HOuSING AUTHORITY, PLAN
FOR TRANSFORMATION 20 (1999)).
218. See id. at 1064.
219. CUNNINGHAM & POPKIN, supra note 3, at 1.
220. RuBNowrrz & ROSENBAUM, supra note 9, at 45.
221. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 45 (citing FISCHER, supra note 176).
222. CUNNINGHAM & POPKJN, supra note 3, at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 6.
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apartment, landlords who will rent to families with children, landlords who will
accept Section 8, and a place with enough bedrooms.226 Respondents also reported
concerns about accessing transportation for apartment hunting.
227
The biggest difference between the GAHP and the current mobility programs
are the number of voucher recipients. GAHP relocated 150 families per year until
1998 when the program had fulfilled HUD's obligation by successfully moving
7100 beneficiaries of housing vouchers. Currently, 1026 households enter CHACs
program each year, and 26,000 vouchers are administered by the CHA's HCV
program. In addition, as "hard" public housing units in Chicago are demolished,
thousands of families will join the HCV rolls. 22 s
Early reports indicate that these mobility programs have not had the same
success as the Leadership Council under the GAHP. The Urban Institute study
found that of the 105 study participants who moved, eight percent moved to
neighborhoods with very low poverty rates (less than ten percent poor); almost a
quarter (twenty-three percent) moved to neighborhoods where the poverty rate was
between ten and twenty percent poor; and the remaining sixty-nine percent moved
to mid range or high-poverty neighborhoods.
229
"Since January 1996, twelve hundred of fifteen hundred relocated families
have resettled in census tracts with a population that is over ninety percent African-
American. 230 Of the thirty census tracts in Chicago receiving the greatest number of
CHA families, all but two are at least ninety-seven percent African-American."
231
Displaced CHA residents have moved to neighborhoods just as isolated and poor as
the ones they left. The many benefits of mixed income communities cannot be
realized in these neighborhoods.
C. Possible Solutions to Relocation Barriers Faced by Displaced CHA Residents
Displaced CHA residents face special challenges as they try to relocate to
economically viable communities. In this Part, programs and polices that would
support CHA residents as they transition from public housing to an apartment in
the private market are discussed. These programs address the personal, community,
and programmatic barriers identified in Part Two. Developing tools to overcome
these barriers are more important than ever before. A study commissioned by the
National Center of Poverty Law found:
[T]hat residents displaced by the demolition now live in other Chicago
neighborhoods that are just as segregated and as poor as the ones they
left. The study tracked more than 3,200 families relocated from public
housing from 1995 to 2002 with Section 8 vouchers or certificates....
It concluded that about 8.3 percent of the residents moved to
neighborhoods that were at least 90 percent black and that nearly 50
226. Id. at 18.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1.
229. Id. at 24.
230. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1081 (citing Flynn McRoberts & Linnet Myers, Out of
the Hole, Into Another, CR. TRIB., Aug. 23, 1998, at Al).
231. Id. (citing Brian Rogal, CHA Residents Moving to Segregated Areas, CHI. REP.,
July-Aug. 1998, at 3). "Of the 19,095 Chicago families using Section 8 vouchers, 70% are
living in census tracts that are at least 90% black." Id. at n.88.
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percent of the families moved to neighborhoods where there was a high
concentration of poverty. The study also found that while some families
located housing in neighborhoods that were slightly better than their old
ones, their new neighborhoods has [sic] high crime, poor schools and
substandard housing.
2 32
These findings are in sharp contrast to the outcomes of the GAHP.233
1. Solutions to Individual Barriers
Currently, nearly 1.7 million households receive a Section 8 housing
subsidy. 234 One million families in forty cities are on waiting lists for public
housing or rent subsidies 235 and during the Clinton administration, 100,000
dilapidated public housing units were demolished.236 Clearly, relocated public
housing residents are a small percentage of the total voucher recipient pool.
However, this population may face greater individual challenges than the typical
voucher recipient does because of their past experiences in public housing and its
corresponding stigmatization. Public housing residents are more likely to be
unemployed, and have lower incomes and education levels.237 Many residents have
criminal records and depend on welfare. 238 These tenants may lose their social and
economic networks when they move. Supportive services, which are often
available in traditional public housing, are not as easily accessible outside the inner
city. 239 Specific challenges to the apartment search include a lack of time and
accessing transportation.
Some of these barriers can be confronted with individualized counseling and
support services. Counselors should help each family come up with a plan to make
the transition to their new home. This may include accessing new social service
providers and streamlining support services. The most difficult challenge may be
for those residents with a criminal record or a family member with a criminal
record. Under the current law, the CHA is under no obligation to help this group of
residents relocate and in some cases may even need to evict them. What will
happen to this group of families is unclear. Perhaps they will move in with other
family members, become homeless, or end up in jail.24°
These recipients need help finding an appropriate unit. Finding an apartment in
a high-poverty area is easier than finding one in a low-poverty, mostly white
suburb. A mobility program should try to lessen the burden of apartment hunting
by locating interested landlords, and driving voucher holders to view apartments in
the suburbs. To implement this solution, each recipient of federal voucher funding
should have to demonstrate that their voucher program has a plan for showing
232. John W. Fountain, Suit Says Chicago Housing Renewal Plan Perpetuates
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at A18.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 99-109.
234. CUNNINGHAM & POPKIN, supra note 3, at 1.
235. Lento, supra note 184, at 171.
236. Id.
237. See supra text accompanying note 121.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 123-31.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 124-31.
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voucher holders apartments in low-poverty areas. This requirement could be added
to HUD's voucher funding regulations.
2. Solutions to Community Barriers
In 1968, Senator Brook, while speaking in support of Title VII stated:
America's future .. .does not require imposed residential and social
integration; it does require the elimination of compulsory segregation in
housing, education, and employment. . . . It does not require that
government interfere with the legitimate personal preferences of
individuals; it does require that government protect the freedom of
individuals to choose where they wish to live.
241
Nearly thirty-five years later, it is clear that some "personal preferences" further
segregation. We need to rethink which personal preferences are legitimate and
which are not. Racism and classism are inappropriate in a diverse society. Next,
this Note addresses programs the government should create through legislation and
regulations that influence individual housing preferences in order to reduce
resistance to integration.
As we saw with scattered-site developments, there is great community
resistance to large numbers of public housing residents or perceived voucher
holders entering a community. The GAHP was partially successful at avoiding this
resistance by moving a small number of voucher holders into nearly 100
neighborhoods. With the new publicity of HCV and the increase in the number of
recipients, suburban dwellers are likely to assume that their new minority neighbors
are voucher recipients whether they are or not. Racism, classism, white flight, and
clustering may become more pronounced and overt as large numbers of CHA
tenants relocate and suburban residents begin to take notice. Suburban
homeowners' prejudices and stereotypes create anxiety that the presence of
voucher holders in their neighborhood will bring crime and reduce property values.
This anxiety may lead to white flight. Mobility grant programs may reduce
white flight by dispersing voucher recipients throughout predominantly white
communities. A mobility grant program would provide "direct economic subsidies
to individual blacks willing to move into predominately white neighborhoods."
242
This payment would be in addition to the HCV, which is "the difference between
30 percent of family income and an agency-prescribed payment standard defined as
some percentage of the 'fair market rent' figure determined by the agency. ' 243 A
mobility grant program would help stimulate black demand for apartments in
mostly white suburbs. The "[s]ubsidies should be only as large as are required to
shift the pattern of black demand. They should be largest for areas with no black
population and should decline rapidly as the black presence increases."
244
However, the success of a mobility grant program would depend on market-
specific research.245
241. 114 CONG. REc. 2525 (1968) (emphasis added).
242. Richard H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of
Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 874, 928 (1988).
243. Schuck, supra note 4, at 320.
244. Sander, supra note 242, at 929.
245. Id.
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The success of metropolitan-wide integration depends on black families being
spread out across the city. 246 There are three main benefits for having blacks move
into neighborhoods surrounding the inner city evenly. First, as more blacks move to
these mostly white neighborhoods, it makes it easier for other blacks to follow
them, encouraging continued integration. 247 Second, if multiple areas are integrated
at the same rate then the demand for housing by blacks in any particular
neighborhood is relatively low.248 Finally, white flight is reduced, and white
demand stabilized, when whites perceive that integration is widespread and diffuse
because it is less likely they will be able to avoid integrating areas by moving.
249
If mobility grants would promote demand for suburban apartments, equity
insurance may promote supply. Equity insurance may increase landlord and
neighbor support of voucher holders moving into their community. Homeowners in
predominately "white areas who are faced with the prospect of integration-and
believe that resegregation will follow--often assume . . . that property values will
fall as blacks enter. '250 This fear fuels neighborhood opposition to integration.251
Equity insurance guarantees owners the property value of their home will not fall
below a certain level. "If property values fall below the insured amount, the owner
can simply sell the property to the insuring government agency. 252 This program
could help stabilize white demand and reduce white flight.
Similarly, voucher holders may fear that racism and classism will make them
targets of hostility if they move into a predominately white neighborhood. Mobility
counseling should include information on the benefits of moving to a mixed-
income neighborhood. The supportive services offered by the HCV program should
also be discussed. With proper information and counseling, voucher holders can
make informed choices about where it is best for them to live.
White resistance to integration that involves violations of local, state, or
federal criminal laws must be met with swift investigation, arrests, and the
accompanying sanctions and punishment.253 Hate crime legislation may help
promote this response because it signals to law enforcement that these offenses
should be treated seriously. 254 Greater enforcement will deter criminals and may
provide victims of these racist attacks comfort knowing that they are not alone and
that the community does not condone these hateful acts.
In the end, white suburbanites need to change the way they view low-income
minorities moving into "their" neighborhood. Much of the current literature
discussing voucher programs tends to view "the economically diverse
neighborhood.., as a magnet to pull poor and presumably deviance-prone people
back into the social mainstream." 255 This presumption must change in order to allay
246. Id. at 928-29. "If nearly all blacks seeking integration move into one or two
neighborhoods on the fringe of the ghetto, black and white demand for housing becomes
dramatically imbalanced and resegregation occurs." Id.
247. Id. at 929.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 930.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
252. Sander, supra note 242, at 930.
253. Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 143, at 397.
254. Id. at 398.
255. Bennett, supra note 14, at 60.
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fears that those "deviance-prone people" will take over the suburban neighborhood
diminishing the neighborhood's quality of life and property values. The best way to
allay these fears may be through experience.
3. Solutions to Programmatic Barriers
Mobility programs should continue to try to convince landlords that accepting
housing vouchers is a good thing. HCV programs that search for available units
should be expanded beyond the city limits. Metropolitan-wide relief is still crucial
to achieving integration and providing all people the opportunity to live in an
economically viable community. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, the
Seventh Circuit held that a metropolitan-wide plan was "necessary and equitable"
to remedy HUD's past discrimination. 256 The court based this holding on the fact
that while low-rent housing was of central importance to the central city, the
problems of isolated public housing extend beyond the city's borders and affect the
surrounding community. Landlords both in the city and its surrounding
communities often view displaced CHA residents as particularly risky tenants. One
simple solution to help recruit landlords is to pay them an extra fee for the
additional administrative tasks HCV programs require.
The shortage of low-income housing shows the need for "hard" public housing
stock and metropolitan-wide mobility programs. The need is particularly great for
families with teenagers and large families. The lack of low-income housing also
shows the importance of Hope VI grants in Chicago and other redevelopment
projects, which seek to create mixed-income public housing where segregated high
rise housing projects used to stand. At the moment, the private market is not able to
meet the HCV programs' demand for low-income apartments in affluent
neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION
Moving individuals from high-rise public housing into neighborhoods with
similar levels of poverty, crime, and educational achievement does not advance the
goals of the Gautreaux litigation. While the dilapidated CHA high-rises needed to
be demolished, the solution is not to move residents from a vertical ghetto to a
horizontal ghetto.257 The positive outcomes attributed to vouchers can not come to
fruition under these circumstances.
The GAHP highlighted Section 8's potential to provide an environment where
social and community networks can be developed in a way that was not possible in
the crime ridden high rise housing projects. When HCV recipients are moved into
less economically disadvantaged neighborhoods they are able to lose some of the
social-status stigma indicated by their address. They may also have access to better
schools for the children, safer neighborhoods, and more job opportunities. All of
the benefits of mixed income communities show that promoting economically and
racially diverse neighborhoods is a worthwhile policy goal.
While HUD met its obligation to relocate the required number of persons in
integrated communities, the CHA has yet to fulfill its obligation of moving the
256. 503 F.2d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 1974); see supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
257. TURNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 46.
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majority of the Gautreaux class of forty thousand families into integrated areas. 258
Individual personal preferences must be changed to promote diverse communities.
Mobility grants, compensating black voucher holders for the extra burden of
moving to white suburbs could increase demand for these apartments in the
suburbs. Increased enforcement of hate crimes targeting blacks could reduce overt
racism and classism and increase demand for housing in the suburbs. Equity
insurance could help diminish the argument that allowing black voucher holders in
the neighborhood will reduce property values and the resulting white flight.
Increased counseling is also needed.
The demolition of thousands of public housing units appears to be straining the
HCV program in Chicago. In the end, there is still a need for public housing stock
to serve low-income families, particularly with large families. Developing this
housing stock will not be easy, as demonstrated with the scattered-site program.
However, the CHA already owns prime real estate in Chicago, which can be
redeveloped into mixed income communities. The more integrated all communities
are, the less resistance there will be to blacks moving into the suburbs and whites
moving into the revitalized housing projects.
The lessons of Chicago's public housing and voucher programs are relevant
across the nation. It is true that most communities do not have HCV programs as
large as Chicago's, nor do they have the same number of public housing residents
seeking affordable housing on a tight deadline. However, economic and racial
segregation is prevalent across the nation and individual housing choices work to
perpetuate that system. Similarly, the solutions I suggest are not limited to a large
city. Requiring HCV programs to help recipients find homes in non-poor
neighborhoods is imperative to reap the benefits of a diverse society.
258. Seliga, supra note 33, at 1065.
Only newly built housing is covered by the CHA judgment order,
which mandates that for every new public housing unit built in a non-
white area, one unit be built in a white area. The Gautreaux plaintiffs
were requesting that the Section 8 program also be covered by the
judgment, so for every resident relocated into private housing with a
Section 8 subsidized rental voucher in a non-white area, one resident be
relocated into rental housing in a white area.
Id. at 1051, n.10 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 981 F. Supp. at 1094). "In a
1997 decision, the court rejected the Gautreaux plaintiffs' request that Section 8 housing
vouchers be covered by the Gautreaux judgment order, which would have enabled public
housing residents with Section 8 vouchers to be relocated equally in white and non-white
areas." Id. at 1051.
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